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Abstract: Environmental problems have become major headlines due to the negative effects they 
bring to the stability of the ecosystem. Thus, the increased awareness of social responsibility or, 
specifically, environmental concern is now a challenge facing the corporate world. Hence this study 
tests whether board size and board composition have any association with the level of firms’ 
corporate environmental disclosure in annual reports. To achieve the objective of this study, a total of 
40 listed firms on the floor of the Nigerian stock exchange market were used. Also, the study 
critically developed and utilized the Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD rating scheme to analyze the 
level of corporate environmental disclosure made by firms in their annual reports for the period 2006-
2010. In addition, the simple regression analysis was used to test the research propositions as stated in 
the study. However, empirical findings from the study reveal that while board size has a significant 
negative relationship with the level of corporate environmental disclosure; board composition on the 
other hand has a significant positive relationship with the level of firms’ corporate environmental 
disclosure in the annual report.  
Keywords: environmental disclosure; stakeholder theory; agency theory; resource dependency theory 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate environmental disclosures has become more salient to board members  
as thinking at the top of organizations shifts toward more broadly defined 
performance than just the bottom line. Environmental issues are an important 
aspect of corporate social responsibility, especially for companies that are 
responsible for high carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons emissions. Hence, 
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corporate decision makers are increasingly called upon to consider the broader 
environmental impact of their business decisions. Boards may be moved to address 
corporate environmental issues for political reasons (Bendell & Kearins, 2005), in 
response to environmental legislation, or to preempt environmental litigation.  
Although there has been an interest in the relationship between board composition 
and corporate social responsibility, less is known about how board composition 
affects corporate environmental disclosures (Ibrahim, Howard & Angelidis, 2003). 
With the growing competition of globalization, strategic decision makers have 
been faced with the competing interests of external and internal stakeholders such 
as greater diversity in corporate governance, undertaking more investments in 
corporate social responsibility and maximizing financial performance. As a result, 
strategic decision makers today must not only increase their financial performance, 
but also satisfy the increasing expectations of customers, suppliers and society as a 
whole. Since these developments have made strategic decision making process 
more complex, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of how companies can 
improve their effectiveness to serve both of these goals.  
The concept of corporate environmental reporting was introduced in the early 
1990s and since then it has rapidly gained acceptance as the means of 
communicating and demonstrating a company’s commitment to improving 
corporate environmental performance to its stakeholders (ACCA 2004). According 
to Gray, Javad, Power & Sinclair (2001), the annual report have provided a plate 
form for a growing number of companies in combining their environmental efforts 
with their economic efforts in demonstrating their accountability for environmental 
stewardship. In developed countries like Netherlands, Japan, United States, United 
Kingdom and France concerns on the environment has been voiced out by the 
government and companies operating in these are encouraged to provide 
information on the impact of their economic activities on the environment in their 
annual reports. However, this is not the same in most developing countries where 
there have been series of social unrest and cases of kidnap arising from the youth 
of the host communities where most of these multinational corporations are 
domiciled due to their negative environmental impacts on the environment. To this 
end therefore, this study will attempt to examine the effects of board size and board 
composition on the level of corporate environmental disclosures among listed firms 
in Nigeria. In the light of the aforementioned objective, the remaining part of this 
study is organized as follows: following the introductory section of this study is the 
literature review and research hypotheses. This is closely followed by the research 
methodology and the empirical findings.  
  
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                         Vol 7, No. 5/2011 
 
 166 
Scope of Study 
This study basically investigates the effects of board size and board composition on 
the level of corporate environmental disclosures among listed firms in Nigeria. To 
achieve this objective, the corporate annual reports for the period 2006-2010 were 
analyzed. In addition, the study considered a total of 40 listed firms in the Nigerian 
stock exchange market. The choice of these industries arises based on their direct 
or indirect contribution to environmental pollution. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Environmental Disclosure 
The scandals of high profile companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some 
other firms in developed economies, have raised the question of the effectiveness 
of monitoring mechanisms in organizations (Raphaelson & Wahlen, 2004). It is 
therefore believed that the focus should now be more on improving the internal 
mechanism, which includes boards, particularly to increase shareholder’s insight 
and influence on corporate behaviour in organizations (Kolk, 2006). Apart from the 
traditional approach to accountability in the context of corporate governance, 
corporate environmental reporting has also emerged, even though it is mostly on a 
voluntary basis concerning the societal and environmental implications (Kolk, 
2006). Disclosure on environmental issues has the potential to increase 
shareholder’s wealth and can be regarded as one of the elements of good corporate 
governance (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002). Nonetheless, the effectiveness of regulation 
on environmental risk, which emphasizes awareness and empowerment of 
shareholders, essentially depends on the quality of the corporate environmental 
disclosure (Sinclair-Desgané & Gozlan, 2002). Consequently, the proper reporting 
of corporate environmental performance is now gaining significant interest in the 
business community and is being debated within the accounting profession and 
authoritative bodies (Rezaee, Szendi & Aggarwal 1995). Environmental costs and 
obligations will continue to grow in line with the consciousness of society, 
government regulation and corporations towards environmental concerns (Rezaee 
et. al, 1995). Therefore, as the scope of potential users may cover both internal and 
external stakeholders, there must be an assurance on the transparency and 
reliability of the information disclosed. Sustainability, specifically, the 
environmental concern and corporate governance need to be converged for better 
reporting. This situation has also been closely linked to the recognition that good 
corporate governance requires consideration of the impact a corporation has on the 
wider community and the environment (Andrew, 2003). More specifically, when 
considering the broader conception of corporate governance, it is clear that good 
governance entails responsibility and due regard to the wishes of all key 
stakeholders and ensuring companies are answerable to all stakeholders (Dunlop, 
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1998). There is thus a clear overlap between this conception of corporate 
governance and the stakeholder conception of corporate environmental disclosure 
that considers business as responsible vis-à-vis a complex web of interrelated 
stakeholders that sustain and add value to the firm (Freeman, 1984). Conversely, 
various corporate environmental disclosure scholars emphasize the need to uphold 
the highest standards of governance internally, particularly in discussions of the 
internal dimension of corporate environmental disclosure (Perrini, Pogutz & 
Tencati, 2006). However, despite the importance of corporate governance and its 
potential influence on companies to engage in environmental reporting, research in 
this area most especially in developing economies are still lacking.  
 
Theories of Corporate Governance 
Theories of Corporate Governance go back to as early as 1970's where Adam 
Smith in his land mark work Wealth of Nations incorporated some distinction 
about management and ownership. Since then certain theories were developed, 
Agency theory, Stewardship theory, Stakeholder theory and Resource dependency 
theory are some of those. According to agency theory, when there is separation of 
management and ownership, the manager seeks to act in self interest which is not 
always in the best interests of the owner and departs from those required to 
maximize the shareholder returns. This agency problem can be set out in two 
different forms known as adverse selection and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Adverse selection can occur if the agent misrepresents his ability to perform the 
functions assigned and gets chosen as an agent. Moral hazard occurs if the chosen 
agent shirks the responsibilities or underperforms due to lack of sufficient 
dedication to the assigned duties. Such underperformance by an agent, even if 
acting in the best interest of the principal, will lead to a residual cost to the 
principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). These costs resulting from sub-optimal 
performance by agents are termed as agency costs. Other theoretical perspectives 
such as stewardship, resource dependency and stakeholder theories also enhance 
our understanding of the role of boards (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Stewardship 
theory views agents as stewards who manage their firm responsibly to improve the 
performance of the firm (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Resource dependency theory 
considers agents as a resource since they would provide social and business 
networks and influence the environment in favour of their firm (Pearce & Zahra 
1992). The resource dependence theory further suggests that the selection of 
outside board members will provide more resources, information, and legitimacy to 
the board (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). The stakeholder theory on the other 
hand expects boards to take into account the needs of an increasing number of 
different stakeholder groups, including interest groups linked to social, 
environmental and ethical considerations (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Wicks, & 
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Parmar 2004). Appreciation of different theoretical perspectives will give insights 
into the contribution of boards to corporate environmental performance.  
 
Prior Studies and Development of Hypothesis  
The earliest literature on board size is by (Lipton & Lorch, 1992 and Jensen, 1993). 
Jensen (1993) argued that the preference for smaller board size stems from 
technological and organizational change which ultimately leads to cost cutting and 
downsizing. Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) argued the possibility that larger boards 
can be less effective than small boards. When boards consist of too many members 
agency problems may increase, as some directors may tag along as free-riders. 
Chaganti, Mahajan, Sharma (1985) also claimed that smaller boards are 
manageable and more often play a role as a controlling function whereas larger 
boards may not be able to function effectively as the board leaves the management 
relatively free. On the other hand, very small boards lack the advantage of having 
the spread of expert advice and opinion around the table that is found in larger 
boards. Furthermore, larger boards are more likely to be associated with an 
increase in board diversity in terms of experience, skills, gender and nationality 
(Dalton & Dalton, 2005). A larger board size may bring a greater number of 
directors with experience that may represent a multitude of values on the board 
(Halme & Huse, 1997).  
Published studies that linked board size and voluntary disclosure of corporate 
environmental information are rather lacking. Besides Halme & Huse (1997), 
which found no significant association between the number of board members and 
the tendency for companies to report on the environment, and Cheng & Courtenay 
(2004), which found a similar result for voluntary disclosure (in which 
environmental information is a part of it); to the authors best knowledge, there is a 
complete dearth of literature in this area of accounting especially in developing 
countries. To this end therefore, this study intends to fill this gap in literature by 
examining the effects of board size and board composition on the level of corporate 
environmental disclosure among listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
3. Research Hypothesis 
With the dearth of literature in this area of accounting, the following hypotheses 
are stated below in the null form. 
H1: there is no significant relationship between board size and the level of 
corporate environmental disclosure among listed firms in Nigerian.  
H2: there is no significant relationship between board composition and the 
level of corporate environmental disclosure among listed firms in Nigerian. 
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4. Research Methodology 
To achieve the objectives of this research, the study has adopted the use of 
corporate annual reports of listed firms as our main source of data. This is due to 
the fact that annual reports are readily available and accessible. Moreso, Gray, 
Kouhy, & Lavers (1995) opined that annual reports should be used in determing 
the level of environmental disclosures because such information is produced 
regularly and will be in the public domain. The annual reports for period 2006-
2010 were used due to the increased level of awareness and pressure from 
stakeholders within these periods. The population for this study is comprised of all 
firms listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31 December 2010. 
However, the selected sample size for this study includes listed firms both in the 
financial and non-financial sectors of the economy which sums up to a total of 40 
firms.  This represents 20% percent of the total population and, thus, is consistent 
with the minimum sample size as suggested by either the conventional sample size 
table proposed by Krejcie & Morgan (1970) or the modern online sample size 
calculator by Raosoft, Inc.  In addition, the study further adopts the use of content 
analysis method of data collection in eliciting data from the annual report. This is 
due to the fact that the content analysis method is the most commonly used method 
of measuring corporate environmental disclosure in annual reports (Milne & Adler, 
1999). Also, it allows corporate environmental information to be systematically 
classified and compared. However, this study attempts to measure the 
environmental disclosure in terms of themes and evidence, using Hackston & 
Milne’s (1996) operational definitions and framework for corporate environmental 
disclosure index. Theme is measured in the categories of environment, energy, 
product, community, and employee health. Evidence is measured in the categories 
of monetary quantitative and non-monetary quantitative disclosures. The corporate 
environmental disclosure framework contained 28 attributes. Consequently, a firm 
could score a maximum of 28 points and a minimum of 0. The formula for 
calculating the reporting scores by using the environmental disclosure index 
(attributes) is expressed in a functional form: 
 28 
RS  =  Σdi 
   
i = 1 
Where: 
RS = Reporting Score  
di = 1 if the item is reported and 0 if the item is not reported 
i  = 1, 2, 3... 28. 
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Also, in order to measure the relationships between the independent (board size 
and board composition) and the dependent (corporate environmental disclosure) 
variables; the ordinary least square regression model was adopted. Furthermore, 
while the board size in this study was proxied by the total number of members on 
the board of directors (BDSIZE); board composition on the other hand was proxied 
by the proportion on non-executive directors (NED). 
Model Specification 
CEDt  = f(BDSIZEt, NEDt, U t……………………………………………….…………………… (1) 
 
This can be written in explicit form as: 
 
CEDt   = β0 + β1BDSIZEt + β2NEDt + Ut…………………………………………………. (2)  
 
Where: 
CED = Corporate environmental disclosure. 
BDSIZE = total number of members on the board of directors. 
NED = the proportion on non-executive directors on the board. 
U = Stochastic or disturbance term. 
t = Time dimension of the Variables  
β0 = Constant or Intercept. 
β1-2  = Coefficients to be estimated or the Coefficients of slope parameters. 
 
Table 1. Proxies and Predicted Signs for Explanatory Variables 
Varia
ble 
Predicted 
Sign 
Type Data Type Scale 
BDSIZ
E 
- Independe
nt 
Continuous Number of board members (n) 
NED + Independe
nt 
Continuous Proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board. 
 
5. Discussion of Findings 
Empirical findings from the Pearson correlation analysis on the relationship 
between board size (proxied as the number of board members) and level of 
environmental disclosure as depicted in table (2) shows that there is a negative  
correlation between board size and the level of corporate environmental disclosure 
among the selected firms; and it is significant at 0.01 level. In addition, results 
from table (2) further indicate that there is a positive correlation between board 
composition and the level of corporate environmental disclosure; and it is 
significant at 0.01 level.  
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 Table 2. Pearson Correlations for Selected Firms in Nigeria 
 CED BDSIZE NED 
CED             Pearson Correlation 
                     Sig. (2-tailed) 
                     N     
1 -.592(**) -.511(**) 
  .000 .001 
40 40 40 
BDSIZE       Pearson Correlation 
                     Sig. (2-tailed) 
                     N     
-.592(**) 1 -.454(**) 
.000   .003 
40 40 40 
NED            Pearson Correlation 
                    Sig. (2-tailed) 
                    N     
.511(**) -.454(**) 1 
.001 .003   
40 40 40 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 3. Model Summary 
 
 
 
Model 
 
 
 
R 
 
 
 
R 
Square 
 
 
Adjusted 
R Square 
 
 
Std. 
Error of  
the 
Estimate  
Change Statistics 
 
R 
Square 
Change 
 
 
F 
chang
e 
 
 
df1 
 
 
df
2 
 
Sig 
F 
Change 
1 .651a .424 .393 5.10076 .424 13.631 2 37 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), NED, BDSIZE 
Table 4. ANOVAb   
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 
Residual 
Total 
709.322 
962.657 
1671.979 
2 
37 
39 
354.661 
26.018 13.631 .000
a
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), NED, BDSIZE 
b. Dependent Variable: CED 
Table 5. Coefficientsb  
 
Model  
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients  
t 
 
Sig. 
          B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 
BDSIZE 
NED  
20.099 
-1.372 
14.877 
8.064 
.424 
 
-.453 
.306 
2.492 
-3.233 
2.183 
.017 
.003 
.035 
a. Dependent Variable: CED 
Furthermore, results for the goodness of fit test as shown in table (3) present an 
adjusted R2 value of about 39%. This in a nutshell means that the value of the 
dependent variable can be explained by 39% of the independent variables. This 
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value can be considered sufficient because a firm’s behaviour towards corporate 
environmental issues is also influenced by other factors beside board size and 
board composition. Nevertheless, while the result for the F- test with a p-value that 
is less than 0.05 (i.e. p-value < 0.05) as reflected in table (4) suggests clearly that 
simultaneously the explanatory variable (i.e. board size and board composition) are 
significantly associated with the dependent variable (corporate environmental 
disclosure); on the other hand, the regression analysis results as presented in table 
(5) indicates that consistent with our a priori expectation (i.e. b1< 0 ), a significant 
negative association does exist between board size (proxied by the number of board 
members) and level of corporate environmental disclosure among the selected 
firms. This result implies that the more the number of board members, the lower 
the level of corporate environmental disclosure. That is to say that there is an 
inverse relationship between board size and the level of environmental 
performance; since larger boards may be less effective in monitoring a firms 
negative environmental impact on the society due to problems such as social 
loafing and higher co-ordination costs. Accordingly, this result is in line with the 
suggestions of the agency theory, which holds that large boards in an organisation 
would result in communication and coordination problems and also decrease the 
managerial ability of the board. This result corroborates the findings in provided 
(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2002) were they found 
out that firms prosecuted for environmental violations have larger boards. 
Nevertheless, these findings contradict the views of Dalton et al. (1999) were they 
opined that larger boards potentially bring more experience and knowledge and 
offer better advice.  They suggested that larger boards are more likely to include 
experts on specific issues such as environmental performance. In addition, further 
empirical findings from the regression analysis result for the second hypothesis 
which states that there is no significant relationship between board composition 
and level of corporate environmental disclosure; indicates clearly that consistent 
with our a priori expectation (b2 > 0), a significant positive relationship does exist 
between board composition and level of corporate environmental disclosure. This 
result invariably implies that the board composition in an organisation have a very 
significant positive role to play in the level of firms’ corporate environmental 
performance. That is, the higher the proportion of the non-executive directors on 
the board; the more likely they will be able to take decisions that are 
environmentally friendly. More so, outside board members are more effective in 
providing corporate social perspectives since they are more conscious about the 
environmental dynamics and the different demands of various stakeholders than 
insider members who are assumed to be more preoccupied with economic utilities. 
Interestingly, empirical evidence provided in this study supports the findings 
provided by (Dunn & Sainty, 2009; Coffey & Wang, 1998:159; Ibrahim & 
Angelidis, 1995; Ibrahim, Howard & Angelidis, 2003) were they found out that 
outside directors are more conscious about philanthropic components of corporate 
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social responsibility than insiders. This is also consistent with the resource 
dependency theory, which holds that outside board members (i.e. non-executive 
director) can be more effective in terms of enhancing corporate image and ensuring 
shareholders’ interests. Similarly, this result is also consistent with the findings of 
Webb (2004) who also suggested that socially responsible firms tend to utilize 
more outsiders in their boards. However, this result contradicts the findings 
provided in McKendall, Sánchez & Sicilian (1999). 
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This study basically looked at board characteristics and corporate environmental 
disclosure among firms in Nigeria. The study came up with interesting findings 
that are of salient importance to scholars investigating corporate governance issues 
in the Nigerian context. In accordance with the first hypotheses, the study observed 
that lager board size in a firm has a negative impact on the level of an organisations 
environmental performance. That is, an inverse relationship does exist between 
board size and the level of environmental performance. This result is however in 
line with the suggestions of the agency theory. For the second hypothesis, the study 
however observed that there is a significant positive relationship between board 
composition and the level of environmental disclosure. That is, increasing the 
proportion of outside directors on the board will led to better corporate 
environmental performance. This is consistent with the resource dependence 
theory, which posits that independent boards enhance corporate image and ensure 
shareholders’ interest. Consequently, this paper concludes that larger 
representations of a firms’ board should be composed of outside directors (i.e. non-
executive directors) since they are more conscious about the environmental 
dynamics and demands of various stakeholders than insider members who are 
assumed to be more preoccupied with economic utilities. Finally, this paper 
therefore calls for further longitudinal studies that will provide insights into some 
reporting patterns among listed firms in the country.    
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Appendix (1). Listed Firms of Selected Listed firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
Market 
S/N List of selected listed Firms S/N List of selected listed Firms 
1 Chemical & Allied Products Plc 21 Evans Medical Plc 
2 D N Meyer Plc 22 G S K Consumer Plc 
3 Nigerian - German Chemical Plc  23 May and Baker Nig. Plc 
4 Okitipupa Oil Palm Plc 24 Pharma - Deko Plc 
5 Presco Plc  25 Guinness Nigeria Plc 
6 Okomu Oil Palm Plc  26 Nigerian Breweries Plc 
7 Ellah - Lakes Plc 27 Jos International Breweries Plc 
8 Livestock   Feeds Plc 28 Champion Breweries Plc  
9 Ashaka Cement Company Plc 29 International Breweries Plc   
10 Benue Cement Company Plc    30 Lafarge West African Portland 
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(BCC) Cement Plc  
11 Ecobank Plc 31 Cement Company of Northern 
(Nigeria) Plc 
12 First Bank Plc 32 Ceramic Manufacturers Nigeria 
Plc  
13 Fidelity Bank 33 African Petroleum Plc 
14 Access Bank plc 34 Chevron  Oil Nigeria Plc 
15 First Bank of Nigeria plc 35 Mobile Oil Nigeria Plc 
16 First inland bank plc 36 Conoil 
17 Guaranty trust bank plc 37 Oando Plc   
18 Oceanic bank international plc 38 Total Nigeria Plc  
19 Berger Paints Plc  39 BOS Gases Plc 
20 BCN Plc 40 African Paints (Nigeria) Plc 
 
Appendix (2). Twenty Eight Testable Environmental Disclosure Items 
S/
N 
Environment Energy Research & 
Development 
Employee Health and 
Safety 
1 Environmental 
pollution 
firms energy policies Investment in research on 
renewal technology 
Disclosing accident 
statistics. 
2 Conservation of 
natural resources 
Disclosing energy 
savings 
Environmental education Reducing or eliminating 
pollutants, irritants, or 
hazards in the work 
environment. 
3 Environmental 
management 
Reduction  in energy 
 consumption 
Environmental research. Promoting employee safety 
and physical or mental 
health  
4 Recycling plant 
of waste products 
Received awards or 
penalties. 
Waste management 
/reduction and recycling 
technology 
Disclosing benefits from 
increased health and safety 
expenditure. 
5 Air emission 
information 
Disclosing increased 
energy 
 efficiency products 
Research on new method  
of production 
Complying with health and 
safety standards and 
regulations. 
6 Environmental 
policies or 
company concern 
for the 
environment 
Conservation of 
energy in the conduct 
of business operations 
Providing information for 
conducting safety 
research on the 
company’s products 
Health and Safety 
Arrangements 
7 Installation of 
effluent treatment 
plant 
Discussion of the 
company’s efforts to 
reduce energy 
consumption 
Information on research 
projects set up by the 
company to improve its 
product in any way 
Establishment of 
Educational Institution 
Source: Hackston & Milne’s (1996). 
  
